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ONE YEAR LATER: THE Los ANGELES RIOTS
AND A NEW NATIONAL POLICY
DR. LYNN A. CURTIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
After the Rodney King beating and the subsequent riots in Los An-
geles last summer, a leading Spanish newspaper warned that the Ameri-
can experience-of the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer-
is common across many established democracies of Europe.' In the
United States over the last decade taxes were increased on the poor and
decreased on the rich, 2 (Figure 1) resulting in a ten percent income de-
cline for the poor and over a 120 percent income increase for the richest
one percent of the American population.3 (Figure 2). This disparity be-
tween the rich and the poor evidences the failure of trickle-down eco-
nomics, as does the continuing recession.
In the late 1960's, after major American urban riots, the Kerner
Riot Commission predicted that America would become two societies,
increasingly separate and less equal. 4 That prophecy has come to pass.
As Robert Reich of Harvard wrote, the American professional class com-
municates far more easily, by facsimile and fiber optics, with its counter-
parts in Europe and Japan than with the poor in south central Los
* President, The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, Washington, D.C. The Foun-
dation is the continuation, in the private sector, of the National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence (of 1968-69) and the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (Kerner Riot Commission of 1967-68). Dr. Eisenhower chaired the Violence
Commission.
From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Curtis was Urban Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development, Executive Director of the President's Urban and Regional policy
Group and Administrator of the forty-three million dollars federal Urban Initiatives Anti-
Crime Program targeted at public housing. Earlier, he was Co-Director of the Crimes of
Violence Task Force of the National Violence Commission. Ph.D. in Urban Studies and
Criminology, University of Pennsylvania; M.Sc. in Economics, University of London; A.B.
in Economics, Harvard University. Special thanks to Eisenhower Foundation Director
Vesta Kimble for her assistance with this Article.
1. Glen Frankel, Foreign Officials, Press Criticize U.S. Over Rioting: Mitterand Blames Rea-
gan-Bush Social Policies; Protection for Korean Americans Urged, WASH. POST, May 2, 1991, at
All.
2. Enterprise Zones: Hearings on H. R. 11 & 3 Before the Sucomm. on Select Revenue Measures
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 254 (1991) (statement of Dr.
Lynn A. Curtis, President, The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation) (referring to KEVIN
PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR (1990)) [hereinafter Enterprise Zones: statement
of Curtis]. See also ISAAC SHAPIRO & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, SELECTIVE PROSPERITY: INCREAS-
ING ECONOMIC DISPARITIES SINCE 1977 (1977).
3. Enterprise Zones: statement of Curtis, supra note 2, at 2 (quoting PHILLIPS, supra note
2).
4. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
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Angeles or the south Bronx. 5 According to sociolinguist William Labov,
the English spoken by the inner-city African-Americans is becoming in-
creasingly different than that spoken by white Americans.
6
One exception to the federal government's disinvestment in the
poor over the last decade has been prison building. The United States
doubled the number of prison cells over the 1980's. 7 (Figure 3). At the
same time, the federal government cut by more than half its spending on
housing for the poor.8 In some ways, then, prison building became
America's national low income housing policy. 9 It is now the case that,
at any one point in time, one out of every four young African-American
males between the age of twenty and twenty-nine would be in prison, on
probation or on parole.' 0 This is an astounding statistic. In addition,
violent crime increased substantially over the time when we were adding
so many minority youth to the prison population. I Internationally, the
United States has the highest rates of incarceration in the industrialized
world, along with the highest rates of violence. 12 (Figures 4 and 5).
Building prisons, and keeping young people in them, is extremely
expensive. It costs more to go to jail than to Yale.' 3 And the continuing
high violent crime rates suggest that the policy of putting young people
in prison was not cost effective for the middle class taxpayer seeking
security for' her or his family. Still, one need not necessarily despair
about the noble experiment in democracy that de Tocqueville described
so eloquently. 14 We already know which policies work in the American
inner-city-policies that are cheaper and far more productive invest-
ments, both economically and in terms of human capital, than trickle-
down economics and prison building. The policy that works can be
characterized as child and youth investment and community
reconstruction.
5. Robert Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES,Jan 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at
16.
6. Malcolm Gladwell, Some Hear Black and White in Divergence of Spoken Word; Reversing a
Trend, Dialects Are Taking On Greater Racial Dimension, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1991, at A3.
7. LYNN A. CURTIS, LORD, How DARE WE CELEBRATE? PRACTICAL POLICY REFORM IN
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AND YOUTH INVESTMENT 4 (1992) (edited version of Reauthoriza-
tion Hearings for The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Before the Subcomm. on
Human Resources of the House Comm. of Education and Labor, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)
(statement of Dr. Lynn A. Curtis, President of The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation)).
8. CURTIS, supra note 7, at 4.
9. CURTIS, supra note 7, at 4.
10. Bill McAllister, Study: 1 in 4 Young Black Men Is in Jail or Court-supervised; Author
Warns of Risk of Losing 'Entire Generation', WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1990, at A3. Compare this
to one in ten Latino men and one in sixteen Caucasion men in the same age group. Id.
11. THE MILTON S. EISENHOWER FOUNDATION, YOUTH INVESTMENT AND COMMUNITY
RECONSTRUCTION: STREET LESSONS ON DRUGS AND CRIME FOR THE NINETIES 9 (1990)
[hereinafter YOUTH INVESTMENT].
12. SeeJAN VAN DIJK, ET AL., EXPERIENCES OF CRIME ACROSS THE WORK: KEY FINDINGS
OF THE 1989 INTERNATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (2d ed. 1991).
13. THE MILTON S. EISENHOWER FOUNDATION, No Quick Fix, NEWS CONFERENCE -
UNITED STATES SENATE, May 19, 1992, at 4.
14. ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans., 1969)
(1900).
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II. CHILD AND YOUTH INVESTMENT
A. Head Start
France possesses the world's most comprehensive system of pre-
school education and child care for high-risk populations. 1 5 So it is no
surprise to the French that Head Start preschool for inner-city children
is the most successful across-the-board American prevention program
ever created. 16 As the conservative corporate presidents, who are mem-
15. Jill Smolowe, Where Children Come First, TIME, Nov. 9, 1992, at 58.
16. Id.
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bers of the Committee for Economic Development in New York City,
concluded, every dollar invested in inner-city preschool in the United
States, creates five dollars in benefits-in terms of less crime, less drugs,
less school dropouts, less welfare dependency and less
unemployment. 17
B. Job Corps 18
When it comes to'high-risk inner-city youth, Head Start preschool is
at one end of the age spectrum. At the other end is Job Corps, also
begun in the late 1960's. The Job Corps may rank as the second most
successful across-the-board American prevention program ever created.
Job Corps, an intensive program, takes seriously the need to provide a
supportive, structured environment for the youth it seeks to assist. Job
Corps features classroom courses, which can lead to high school
equivalency degrees, counseling and hands-on job training for very
high-risk youth. Corps programs are located in rural and urban set-
tings. 19 Some of the urban settings are campus-like.20 Others essen-
tially are "on the street. ' '2 1 In the original design, a residential setting
provided sanctuary away from one's home. 2 2 Today, nonresidential var-
iations are being tried, and it will be important to compare their cost-
effectiveness to the live-in design. Yet, even for the non-residential pro-
grams, the notion of an extended-family environment has been
maintained.
23
According to United States Department of Labor statistics, during
the first year after the experience, Job Corps members are one-third less
likely to be arrested than nonparticipants. 24 Every dollar' spent the on
Job Corps resulted in one dollar and forty-five cents in benefits-includ-
ing reduced crime and substance abuse (which account for forty-two
cents in benefits alone), reduced welfare dependency, increased job pro-
ductivity and higher income. 2 5 Evaluations conducted during the Rea-
gan Administration (which tried to eliminate Job Corps) 2 6 found that
seventy-five percent ofJob Corps enrollees move on to a job or to full-
time study.27 Graduates retain jobs longer and earn about fifteen per-
17. See COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEV. CHILDREN IN NEED, INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR
THE EDUCATIONAL DISADVANTAGED (1987).
18. For more information on job corps programs see, Steven Greenhouse, Lessons
Across Six Decades As Clinton Tries to Make Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at Al; Spencer
Rich, Job- Training Program Is Paying Off-for Some, WASH. POST, May 23, 1992, at All;
Morton B. Sklar, ProposedJTPA Reforms Miss the Mark, 11/7 YOUTH POLICY 36 (Sept./Oct.
1989).





24. Id. at 13.
25. Id
26. Id.
27. YOUTH INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 13.
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cent more than if they had not participated in the program. 28 Along the
same lines, a United States General Accounting Office study concluded
that Job Corps members are far more likely to receive a high school
diploma or equivalency degree than comparison group members and
that the positive impact on their earnings continues after training. 29
Robert Taggart, a strong supporter ofJob Corps, asserts that those who
doubt that labor market problems are real and serious, that social inter-
ventions can make a difference or that the effectiveness of public pro-
grams can be improved will find little to support their preconceptions in
the experience of programs like Job Corps. 30 In contrast to Job Corps,
the present federal job training system, the Job Training Partnership
Act, has failed for high-risk youth. Evaluations have shown that youth in
the program actually did worse than comparable youths not in the
program.31
C. Kids In-between
In-between the very young children who need to receive Head Start
and older teens and young adults who can benefit from Job Corps-type
remedial education, training and placement, there already exist success-
fully evaluated, model inner-city programs for high-risk children and
youth aged roughly seven to fifteen. 3 2 The Argus Community in the
Bronx and Centro Sister Isolina Ferre, in Puerto Rico, illustrate these
positively evaluated, indigenous, community-based initiatives.
The Argus Community: The Argus Community, on East 160th Street
in the Bronx, was founded in 1968, by Elizabeth Sturz, a poet and for-
mer probation officer.3 3 Argus is a community-based center for high-
risk youth, mainly African-American and Puerto Rican. It provides "an
alternative life program for adolescents and adults who have been on
the treadmill of unemployment, under-employment, street hustling,
welfare, substance abuse, crime and prison who saw no way out for
themselves."
'3 4
Through residential and nonresidential programs, Argus seeks to
offer some fundamentals too often lacking in the families and communi-
ties from which these youths come.3 5 The goal is to create an extended
family of responsible adults and peers that offer "warmth, nurturance,
communication, and structure," and that model and teach productive
values.3 6 Within that "extended family" setting, the program offers pre-
28. Id.
29. Rich, supra note 18, at All.
30. See ROBERT TAGGART, A FISHERMAN'S GUIDE: AN ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING AND
REMEDIATION STRATEGIES (The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research ed.,
1981).
31. Rich, supra note 18, at All.
32. See, e.g., YOUTH INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 15.
33. Id. at 15. For a more in-depth account of The Argus Community, see ELIZABETH
LYTTLETON STURZ, WIDENING CIRCLES (1983).




DENVER UNIVERSITY L W REVIEW
vocational, vocational and academic training, and works to link those
who have been trained with employers in the city.
3 7
Over time, Argus added day care, family planning, health care and
early education, which not only provided parenting assistance for the
children of teen mothers in the program but also sought to "teach the
young mothers-and fathers-how to be good parents. ' '3 8 Founders of
Argus believed that "angry, alienated teenagers can be pulled in, can be
brought to the point where they not only do not steal and assault, but
have something to give to the society."
'3 9
The nonresidential program, the Learning for Living Center, is
mostly for teenagers who are at risk but not yet in serious trouble. It is
designed to provide alternative life training to prevent the youth from
ending up in the residential program, which is for those somewhat older
with more serious problems-today, especially drugs.40 So a full range
of intervention has evolved, from early prevention to treatment.
4 '
Some clients are referred to Argus from throughout New York City,
but most come from the neighborhood. Argus youth are at higher risk
than the clients of most other community-based youth agencies in New
York City.4 2 Despite this extremely troubled clientele, the program has
had encouraging successes.
43
The Eisenhower Foundation evaluated a cycle of the Argus day
time, nonresidential Learning for Living Center. Youth were assessed
over twenty weeks of training and then over a follow-up period. Meas-
ures were taken before and after, nine months apart, with one-hundred
high-risk Argus youth and one-hundred comparable youth who did not
receive training. Argus youth had higher salaries, and received more job
benefits than the comparison youth. 44 To complement these findings,
federal studies show that sixty-seven percent of the Argus Community's
enrollees attained non-subsidized job placement in nineteen eighty.
45
This is a much higherjob-placement rate than for similar high-risk youth
who are not involved in the program. 46 These studies also demon-
strated lower crime recidivism rates for Argus graduates than for gradu-
ates from almost any other program in New York City that works with
such high-risk youth.
47
An evaluation was conducted of Argus' Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA)48 program for high-risk inner-city youths by Professor La-
Rue Jones under the auspices of the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation in
37. Id.










48. Job Training Partnership Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-1791 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
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1987. 49 The study concluded that Argus enrollees (1) showed increased
scores on conduct and morality, (2) received higher salaries, (3) paid
more taxes and (4) received morejob benefits than a comparable group
of trainees who did not receive the support services offered by the Argus
Community.5 0
Centro Sister Isolina Ferre: Centro Sister Isolina Ferre, in the La Playa
neighborhood of Ponce, Puerto Rico, was started in 1968 by a Catholic
nun, Sister Isolina Ferre, who had spent the past several years working
on New York City's toughest streets. 5 l Playa de Ponce was a community
"where 16,000 people lived neglected by government and private agen-
cies" with delinquency rates more than twice that of the rest of the city
of Ponce, high unemployment, poor health conditions, no basic health
care services, and "few, if any, resources." 52 Centro began on the prem-
ise, "If family and community could be strengthened, and meaningful
employment made available," it might be possible to "make substantial
progress in the struggle against neighborhood crime and violence."1
5 3
With this vision, Sister Isolina, began to put into place several pro-
grams designed to develop the competence of community youth.5 4 One
example stands out especially: the system of youth advocates or "inter-
cessors." These were young, streetwise community people who became
all-around advocates and mentors for young people brought before the
juvenile court. 55 The advocates would "get to know the youth and his
or her peers and family, and would look into the schoolwork, family situ-
ation, and day-to-day behavior of the youth."' 56 They would involve the
youth in a range of developmental programs Centro created, including
job training, recreation and tutoring. 5 7 Their role went well beyond
simple individual counseling; the advocate was to "become familiar with
the whole living experience of the youth," to work with "the family, the
peers, the school, the staff, the police and the court." In short, "to help
the community become aware of the resources it had that should help
the youth develop into a healthy adult." 58 After some initial mistrust,
the police began to work closely with the intercessors, often calling them
first before taking a youth to court.
59
Centro also developed innovative educational alternatives for youth
at risk of dropping out of school, and a program of family supports
through "advocate families" who took the lead in helping their neigh-
49. Larue Jones, Minority Inner-City Youth Employment Crime Reduction Evaluation, final
report grad # 0091403 (Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation ed., 1987).
50. Id.







58. Id. at 13-14.
59. Id. at 14.
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bors with family problems. 60 They created an extensive job-training
program, on the premise that "building a community without jobs for
youth is like trying to build a brick wall without cement."
'6 1
Charles Silberman called Centro "the best example of youth and
community regeneration I found anywhere in the United States." 62 La
Playa is considered the toughest neighborhood in Ponce. Yet over the
period of initial operations of Centro, from 1970 to 1977, the rate of
reported juvenile offenses was fairly constant in Ponce, while it showed a
decline of eighty-five percent in La Playa.
6 3
Centro and the Eisenhower Foundation now replicate and evaluate
the program in San Juan. The replication embraces all the original edu-
cation, mediation and employment initiatives begun in Ponce, but adds
community-based policing. A police mini-station was built at the en-
trance to the "campus" where the other initiatives are located. A police
officer lives with his wife and three children above the mini-station. For
the most part, the officer does not make arrests. He works on preven-
tion, accompanied by other officers not in residence. Preliminary assess-
ments show the number of crimes reported decreased in the Centro
precinct as compared to other San Juan precincts.
64
D. Multiple Solutions to Multiple Problems
Such programs for children and youth of middle ages seem to have
some common underlying principles. There is always some kind of
sanctuary-a place to go off the streets. The sanctuary provides an ex-
tended-family-like setting where both social support and discipline exist.
Adult role models and mentors act as big brothers and big sisters. This
extended family environment encourages young people to stay in school
or begin innovative community-based remedial education, sometimes
using novel computer-based software.6 5 In the successful programs, re-
medial education is linked to specific job training or to college educa-
tion. 66 In turn, job training is linked to job placement. 67 This is
important, because the JTPA, which is the failed American federal youth
job training program, unlike the excellent German system, 68 does not




62. CHARLES SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 434-35 (1978).
63. Id.
64. See THE MILTON S. EISENHOWER FOUNDATION, JUNTA DE COLABORACION POLICIA Y
COMMUNIDAD (unpublished evaluation reports, on file with The Milton S. Eisenhower
Foundation).
65. These are computer-assisted learning programs that allow youth to progress at
their own speed unhindered by the stigma or embarrassment of being "behind" other
students in the classroom situation. An example of such a program is a program devel-
oped by USA Basics. See generally TAGGART, supra note 30.
66. YOUTH INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 55.
67. Id.
68. Marc Fisher, German Job Training: A Modelfor America? U.S. Experts Examining Govern-
ment-Industiy Apprenticeship Program, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1992, at Al.
69. Rich, supra note 18, at A 1l.
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In spite of the inadequacies of the JTPA, some local community or-
ganizations supplement it with better training placement operations. 7
0
Job placements can economically develop the neighborhood. One ex-
ample is in the rehabilitation of housing.7 ' In some of these successfully
evaluated programs, community-based and problem-oriented policing
assists the economic development process, as is the case with the Centro
San Juan mini-station. 72 Such community policing does not usually re-
duce crime in inner city neighborhoods, based on careful evaluations,
but it can reduce fear in urban middle class neighborhoods.7 3 The fear
reduction can help encourage businesses and the public sector to build
in the inner city. If this economic development is planned correctly, it
provides jobs for high-risk youth. The youth qualify for the jobs by pos-
sessing adequate job training and then completing high school, which is
made possible by the mentoring, social support and discipline created in
extended family sanctuaries.
Accordingly, the most successful programs seem to provide multi-
ple solutions to multiple problems in the American inner city. The im-
plication is that we do not necessarily need more experiments or more
demonstrations. We need to replicate to scale what already works-for
preschoolers, for middle school children and for youth who require job
training and placement. This means (1) Head Start for three years for
all poor children; (2) a new job training and placement system with a
more Job Corps-type investment for all who qualify; and (3) a National
Corporation for Youth Investment in the private, non-profit sector that
replicates the principles underlying successful inner city community
based initiatives, like Argus and Centro. In the words of David
Hamburg, President of the Carnegie Corporation in New York, "We
know enough to act, and we can't afford not to act. "74
II. COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION
Part One described the child and youth investment side of a prag-
matic new policy, but what about the community reconstruction side?
Again, there already exist several models of success. Over more than a
decade, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation 75 and the Enterprise
Foundation, have financed and built over 35,000 units of low-income
housing for the poor and millions of square feet of commercial space
70. YOUTH INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 71.
71. Id. at 74.
72. The Centro San Juan mini-station is a nonresidential program that prepares high-
risk teenagers and young adults from the neighborhood for grammar school and high
school equivalency examinations. In addition to the focus on education, the program at-
tempts to develop supportive social skills and values that will mitigate against delinquency,
drug abuse and unemployment. Id. at 57.
73. Id. at 42.
74. David A. Hamburg, Fundamental Building Blocks of Early Life, in THE CARNEGIE COR-
PORATION OF NEW YORK, ANNUAL REPORT (1987).
75. The Local Initiatives Support Corporation is a private-sector corporation created
in the early 1970's by the Ford Foundation. Its purpose is to generate neighborhood-
based economic development in the private sector--operating through nonprofit commu-
nity development organizations. YOUT INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 67.
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through community development corporations ("CDC"s). The CDCs
are now the biggest developers of low-income housing in the United
States, larger than the American federal government.76 These organiza-
tions make loans and grants directly to local community-based, inner-
city non-profit organizations.
7 7
The number of such local non-profit organizations, which can pro-
vide "bubble up" economic development, rather than trickle down de-
velopment that has failed, needs to be greatly expanded in the United
States. To better facilitate this development, the federal government
needs to capitalize inner-city, minority-owned banks, like the model
South Shore Bank in Chicago, which made investments in its neighbor-
hood to revive economically depressed black neighborhoods and re-
verse the process of urban decay. 78 Beyond housing rehabilitation,
inner-city non-profit development corporations need to lead the way in
the repair of the urban infrastructure, including new roads, highways
and rapid rail systems. The generated employment needs to be for
high-risk youth, as well as for lower, working and middle class Ameri-
cans-as part of an urban reinvestment agenda that moves the country
from recession.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Doing What Works
This policy of child investment, youth investment and community
reconstruction is simply common sense. It takes those programs already
working in the public sector and combines them with those programs
that have already worked in the private sector. It builds on the experi-
ence that private sector human and economic development, is, for the
most part, better led by non-profits than by for-profits in the inner city
because non-profits are better able to bubble up ideas from indigenous
leaders in inner-city communities. The idea, based on careful evalua-
tions, is to replicate to scale those public and private non-profit pro-
grams that already have succeeded, based on careful evaluations.
Such a policy needs to be funded for a minimum period of ten
years, at a level of ten billion dollars per year in new spending on child
and youth investment and twenty billion dollars per year in new budget
authority on community reconstruction. 79 The cost of the community
reconstruction would simply bring some federal housing and urban de-
76. Private Cures for Public Ills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1991, at A24.
77. Id.
78. Michael Quint, This Bank Can Turn a Profit And Follow a Social Agenda, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 1992, at Al.
79. THE MILTON S. EISENHOWER FOUNDATION, INVESTING IN CHILDREN AND YOUTH, RE-
CONSTRUCTING OUR CITIES: DOING WHAT WORKS TO REVERSE THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (forthcoming 1993) (document published in commemoration of the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (The Kerner
Riot Commission) of which the Eisenhower Foundation is the continuation thereof) (on
file with the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation) [hereinafter INVESTING IN CHILDREN].
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velopment budget authority up to where it was before 1980.80
B. Beware of Fool's Gold
It is equally important to advocate against what does not work, based
on scientific evaluations and years of experience. A recent theater in
London revived the play, "The Alchemist,"' about people duped by
the promise of fool's gold. Over the last ten years, the American federal
government tried to sell a lot of fool's gold to the American public, in-
cluding the false promises of enterprise zones, volunteerism, self-suffi-
ciency, partnerships and employment.
1. Enterprise Zones
Enterprise zones, currently the most fashionable false promise
among many Republicans and Democrats,8 2 represent still more failed
trickle-down economics. The basic notion is that, through tax incentives
to entrepreneurs, we can create new businesses in the inner city. Over
the last decade enterprise zones have been tried in nearly forty states.
Yet, evaluations have not found significant employment or economic de-
velopment benefits.8 3 For example, in Louisville, Kentucky, there was
little evidence that tax breaks induced anyone to invest in an enterprise
zone who would not otherwise have done so.8 4 Only fourteen percent
of the jobs created in the zone went to persons unemployed or on wel-
fare who lived in the zone.8 5 And the United States General Accounting
Office's evaluation concluded that the Maryland enterprise zone pro-
gram "did not stimulate economic growth as measured by employment
or strongly influence most employers' decisions about business
location."
8 6
Enterprise zone-like tax breaks and related benefits have also led to
scandals in the inner-city, such as the money misspent by the Wedtech
Corporation in the Bronx.8 7 As recent studies in the United States and
in Great Britain show, the hidden costs of enterprise zone strategies in
lost tax revenues actually render them prohibitively expensive, in terms
of costs per job created.8 8 The conservative economist concluded that
enterprise zones are often wasteful and tend to displace rather than cre-
80. Id.
81. Ben Johnson, The Alchemist, in PLAYs AND POEMS 9 (London, George Routlegde
and Son, 2d ed. 1886).
82. Not so EZ, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 1989, at 16.
83. Enterprise Zones: Hearings on JR. 11 & 23 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Meas-
ures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 247 (1991) (Statement of
William J. Cunningham, Legislative Representative, American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations) [hereinafter Enterprise Zones: statement of Cunning-
ham]. See also Enterprise Zones: statement of Curtis, supra note 2, at 261-62.
84. Enterprise Zones: statement of Curtis, supra note 2, at 262.
85. Id.
86. Enterprise Zones: statement of Cunningham, supra note 83, at 247.
87. Enterprise Zones: statement of Curtis, supra note 2, at 262.
88. Not so EZ, supra note 82, at 16. A recent study in Great Britain found that the one-
time cost for each extra job created was approximately fifty thousand dollars. Id.
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ate business activity. 89
Regardless of what enterprise zone experiment one chooses from
among the many proposed, it is hard to find any plan that recognizes
that the formula for success is multiple solutions to multiple problems,
and that social development must be integrated with economic develop-
ment in a very comprehensive way. 90 For example, if entrepreneurs
were given trickle-down benefits in the inner-city, what provision is
there for them to hire high-risk youths and ex-offenders given that their
business already is, by definition, risky? What provision is there for re-
medial education, linked to Jobs Corps-type training and continued
counselling via mentors during job placement by the ex-offenders in the
businesses created by the entrepreneurs? 9 1 Few schemes show clearly
how there will be sufficient educational and employment investments in
high-risk youth over a sustained period of time with sufficient mentor-
ing.9 2 Nor, typically, in enterprise zone experiments are indigenous
community leaders given true leadership roles.93 For example, corpo-
rate and business leaders are given a stake in running Private Industry
Councils as part of the present ineffective job training program for high-
risk youth.
94
What we need instead is bubble-up social and economic develop-
ment that creates real infrastructure in devastated communities. For-
profits can help in the development of that infrastructure, as long as the
process is led by non-profits. 95 Once the infrastructure is in place, more
for-profit institutions will find it more attractive to invest in these com-
munities. It is at this stage of development of the inner-city, and not
before, that we should return to the potential role of for-profit enter-
prise zones.
2. Volunteerism
We have been told that vast sums are needed for paid professionals
in the military,9 6 but that volunteerism is one of the answers to inner-
city dilemmas. However, neighborhood block watches, composed of
volunteers, do not work to reduce crime in the inner-city. 9 7 Mentoring
as a form of volunteerism has even more potential. But, based on avail-
able evaluations, even mentoring fails unless the volunteers possess the
right motivation, have appropriate experience and sufficient re-
89. Enterprise Zones: statement of Curtis, supra note 2, at 262; see also Not so EZ, supra
note 82, at 16.
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sources. 9 8 So let us be a bit cautious about those thousand points of
light.
3. Self-Sufficiency
Grantees often are told by funders that, after a two- or three-year
federal government grant, an inner-city program should become self-
sufficient. 99 In some instances we are able to create for-profit businesses
that allow federal programs to continue.'0 0 But, when it comes to ut-
terly devastated communities like south central Los Angeles, the south
side of Chicago, the south Bronx or southeast Washington, D.C., where
there is little infrastructure in place, 1 1 it is naive to assume that pro-
grams will become self-sufficient.' 0 2 We need long-term commitments
with comprehensive solutions.
4. Partnerships
The federal government sometimes uses the word partnership as
fool's gold as well, encouraging coalitions of programs and organiza-
tions, with the promise that there is strength in numbers.' 0 3 But if, for
example, one coordinates an unsuccessful inner-city program like block
watches with an unsuccessful inner-city program like enterprise zones,
the result will be a coordinated but still unsuccessful partnership. We
must be sure, then, that individual interventions are partnered with
other programs that actually work.
5. Empowerment
Finally, beware of the word empowerment, often used in the con-
text of public housing in the United States. 1° 4 Public housing tenants
are encouraged to empower themselves by managing their own estates.
But this is done in only a very few places, where, of course, visiting dig-
nitaries are taken. 0 5 These are nonetheless, the exception. Most hous-
ing projects in the United States are not managed by residents, and the
federal government has neglected to provide funding to train residents
or for physical maintenance of their buildings. 10 6 Similarly, there is
rhetoric about home ownership for the poor, but little follow through
on the promises. 10 7 There is not much talk about empowerment
through education and employment, which are the real answers. As a
result, American psychologists invented a new term "post-empower-
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MENTORING MOVEMENT (1992).
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ment syndrome."' 108 This refers to programs for the poor, that are
funded for a few years, then encouraged to become self-sufficient.
When the program fails, participants realize they are not empowered,
the poor become even more frustrated and angry. 10 9
6. Resources
Enterprise zones, volunteerism, self-sufficiency, partnerships and
empowerment. Fool's gold has been for sale because the federal gov-
ernment has been unable and unwilling to invest the substantial re-
sources needed to replicate enough programs sufficient to make a
national impact. Europe and Japan have been more responsible, mor-
ally and economically, than the United States over the last decade in
investing in children, youth and urban infrastructure. Only the federal
government has enough resources to generate change that will have a
significant national impact to leverage the additional private and local
public funds needed.
Long-term comprehensive policy should be financed through a
number of well discussed, bi-partisan plans-like breaking down the
budgetary "Berlin Wall" that now proscribes reallocating defense and
foreign aid funds into domestic investment, increasing taxes on the rich-
est one percent (who had their taxes reduced and incomes increased by
120 percent over the 1960's)"10 and redirecting some pension fund in-
vestments in ways that benefit our children, youth and cities. America
found the money to fight the Persian Gulf War and it found the hun-
dreds of billions of dollars needed to bail out the failed, deregulated
savings and loan industry. The United States can find the money for a
true strategy of child and youth investment and community reconstruc-
tion. All we need is the leadership at the very top. We now have that
leadership.
IV. CONCLUSION
If we are to reverse the betrayal of the American democracy, wise
national leaders also need to embrace wise citizens. In the words of Wil-
liam Greider, "Rehabilitating democracy will require citizens to devote
themselves first to challenging the status quo, disrupting the existing
contours of power and opening the way to renewal.""' Common peo-
ple must engage their surrounding reality and "question the conflict be-
tween what they are told and what they see and experience." '" 2 In the
United States, this means old fashion grassroots political lobbying to
gain full funding for preschools modeled after the French experience
and job training modeled after the German experience. It means mas-
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sive voter registration of the poor. It means tight controls on special
interest group lobbyists in Washington, D.C., the people who walk down
K Street in thousand dollar suits and alligator shoes. It means public
financing of elections, elimination of contribution loopholes and far
shorter campaigns that limit both the use of money and the use of televi-
sion, as is the case in the United Kingdom.
We need not continue pushing the rock up-hill. There is hope. We
know what works. We no longer need to defer the American dream for
substantial portions of the American population.
"What happens to a dream deferred," asked the honored African-
American poet, Langston Hughes:
Does it dry up
like a raisin in the sun?
Or fester like sore-
And then run?
Does it stink like rotten meat?
Or crust and sugar over-
like a syrupy sweet?
Maybe it just sags
like a heavy load.
Or does it explode? 
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